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Abstract 
The notion of dominant designs deals with dominance in the market and the dominant design 
is thought to be dominant because of market selection forces. The notion thus ignores the 
possible selection that takes place in pre-market R&D stages of technological trajectories. In 
this paper we ask the question whether pre-market selection takes place and if this can lead to 
an early dominant design. Furthermore we study what selection criteria apply during this 
phase, in the absence of actual market criteria. We do so through an analysis of prototyping 
trajectories for hydrogen vehicles. 
Prototypes are used by firms in their internal search process towards new designs and at the 
same time they are means of communicating technological expectations to outsiders. In both 
senses, prototypes can be taken as indicators of technological trajectories in the ongoing 
search process of an industry for the dominant prototype design of the future. Using 
prototypes as representation of intermediate outcomes of the search process, a dominant 
design can possibly be recognized also in a pre-market phase of development. 
We analyzed the designs of prototypes of hydrogen passenger cars from the 1970s till 2008. 
In our analysis we try to show to what extent the designs configurations of the technological 
components, converge or diverge over time. For this we compiled a database of 224 
prototypes of hydrogen passenger cars. The database describes: the car’s manufacturer, year 
of construction, type of drivetrain, fuel cell type, and capacity of its hydrogen storage system. 
We draw conclusions with regard to the convergence/divergence of the prototypes’ designs 
and the role of diverse performance criteria therein. 
We conclude that there is convergence towards a dominant design in the prototyping phase; 
the PEM fuel cell combined with high pressure storage. Performance played a role as 
selection criterion, but so did regulation and strategic behaviour of the firms. Especially 
imitation dynamics, with industry leaders and followers, seems to be the major explanatory 
factor. 
  11  Introduction 
A dominant design is the most commonly used configuration for serving a purpose by using 
technology (Abernathy and Utterback 1978). Since Abernathy and Utterback, many scholars 
have built on this notion and elaborated its definition (Anderson and Tushman 1990; 
Henderson and Clark 1990; Suarez and Utterback 1995; Murmann and Frenken 2006). All 
definitions have in common that a dominant design is dominant in the market; dominant 
designs gain market shares larger than 50%. However, innovation trajectories take-off long 
before market introduction of assembled products takes place. In the years up to that point, 
many designs are tried and tested in laboratories and other experimental settings in the form 
of prototypes. One could expect that some selection already takes place in that phase and that 
not all prototyped designs make it to the market. In that sense, there is an evolutionary 
development of designs and possibly at the same time an evolution of the selection criteria 
that apply to the designs. In this paper we ask the question whether the contours of a 
dominant design are emerging in the pre-market prototyping phase and what selection criteria 
and mechanisms apply in the absence of market forces. 
We will argue that the pre-selection of designs in this phase of the innovation process is based 
on expectations of future performance of the technological components and on herding 
behaviour of firms. The technological components that are used in the early designs are far 
from mature, network externalities are lacking and the precise selection criteria that will apply 
in the market are unknown or at least unsure. As a result, selection is made on the basis of 
expectations of future development of technologies, the emerging sociotechnical system, the 
future market and government regulation. Prototypes are thus not only material outcomes of 
R&D but at the same time they are platforms on which expectations of the future are 
projected. Or in other words: prototypes are materialized expectations, expectations held by 
their producers of both the prototype itself as well as anticipations towards the expected 
selection environment. 
We study this through a historical analysis of forty years of hydrogen vehicle prototyping in 
the automotive industry. The analysis contains both an overview of the designs used in the 
industry as a whole as well as an analysis of individual firms and their prototypes. First of, we 
will further discuss the notion of dominant designs and selection mechanisms therein. 
 
2  Selection of Dominant Designs 
Much is written on the selection of dominant designs; why did the dominant design become 
dominant? The most straightforward answer is that the dominant design is the best design in 
terms of performance and price (Abernathy and Utterback 1978; Anderson and Tushman 
1990; Christensen and Rosenbloom 1995). Anderson and Tushman (1990) have argued that 
the emergence of a new dominant design is preceded by a technological discontinuity. A 
discontinuity that brings an order of magnitude improvement in price vs performance over the 
existing dominant design (Tushman and Anderson 1986). From the moment that the new 
design, or regime of designs, is introduced on the market, competition takes off between the 
old and the new regime, but also within the new regime; the era of ferment. The era of 
ferment results in the emergence, or selection and subsequent retention, of the new dominant 
design that will dominate until the next technological discontinuity. 
To speak of technological discontinuities with superior performance, is to assume that 
performance can indeed be defined and measured for a given design and it competitors. And 
furthermore it assumes that the performance measure is robust throughout times. For many of 
the cases described in dominant design literature, such as storage capacity for digital hard 
drives, this might be right. However, in the case of many emerging technologies, performance 
on a single measure cannot be the explanation for the selections made and often some sort of 
negotiations take place to determine relevant criteria (Das and Van de Ven 2000). 
  2Besides performance, other selection criteria have been proposed in the dominant design 
literature as well. These take into account other variables and strategic manoeuvring of the 
firms. According to Murmann and Frenken (2006), mechanisms have been suggested such as 
economies of scale in niche markets in the early stages of diffusion (Frenken et al. 1999)), 
and the advantage gained through network externalities (Rosenkopf and Nerkar 1999) of a 
design in its early stage of market adoption. These mechanisms can only take effect once the 
(niche) market has been entered. The same goes in that respect for licensing of standards and 
strategic maneuvering as in the case of VHS video recorders (Cusumano et al. 1992). 
Regulatory changes can also play a role in the emergence a new dominant design (Miller et al. 
1995; Islas 1999)
1. Islas concludes from a case on gas turbine development that newly 
imposed regulation hampered the existing designs and favored the new technology. 
All of these mechanisms take effect when the market is entered by one or more new designs. 
For emerging technologies that have not entered the market, the absence of market forces 
makes that other selection criteria guide firms in their search for the optimum design for a 
new product. Islas
2, citing Willinger and Zuscovitch (1993), describes this phase as the pre-
paradigmatic phase, the one that precedes the introduction of a new paradigm to the market. 
Some dominant design studies have indeed taken on the selection of designs in a pre-market 
phase of development. In fact, these often deal with the period right before and after market 
introduction, firms seeking support for their design and alliances between firms to make sure 
that their common design makes a strong competitor. 
To provide an overview of selection criteria and mechanisms in both before and after market 
entry, table 1 presents the major findings in dominant design literature. For selection in the 
market, a distinction can be made between competition between the old and the new design 
and the competition between multiple contenders in a new product class, for which no old 
design needs to be battled. For the pre-market phase, some selection mechanisms have been 
identified, but thorough insight in this is still lacking. These studies deal mostly with designs 
that are lined-up for market entry and it is much more about creating the conditions for 
successful entry (standardization efforts and other forms of cooperation between firms) than 
about an open battle for optimal designs
3. Hence, we aim to provide insight in the dynamics 
of the competition and the selection criteria and mechanisms at work, especially in the 
prototyping phase when firm have not decided on the design to enter the market with. In the 
following we discuss literature on pre-market competition in more detail and we formulate 
hypothesizes about the selection criteria and mechanisms at play in the pre-market phase. 
 
Table 1 Selection of Dominant Designs in different phases 
Phase Successive  dominant  designs 
in the market 
Dominant design in new 
product class in the market 





- superior performance and 
price (Abernathy and 
Utterback 1978; Anderson and 
Tushman 1990; Christensen 
and Rosenbloom 1995) 
- compatibility with existing DD
(Hagedoorn et al. 2001)  
- regulation  (Islas 1999) 
- superior performance 
(Frenken et al. 1999; 
Rosenkopf and Nerkar 1999) 
- first to market or initial (niche) 
market leader (Hounshell 
1985; Klepper 2002)  
- network externalities (Frenken 
et al. 1999; Rosenkopf and 
Nerkar 1999) 
- strategic maneuvering 
(Cusumano et al. 1992; Van de 
Ven and Garud 1994; 
Liebowitz and Margolis 1995)  
- standardization/regulation 
(Hounshell 1985; Klepper 
2002) 
- promising breakthroughs in 
performance (Grindley 1995) 
on the development of CD 
players (demonstrated to be 
superior to existing DD) 
- regulation (Miller et al. 1995; 
Islas 1999) 
- organizational support (Wade 
1995; Rosenkopf and Nerkar 
1999). 
- strategic maneuvering 
(Grindley 1995; Das and Van 
de Ven 2000; Garud et al. 
2002; Funk 2003) 
- demonstration of technical 
feasibility in a prototype 
                                                      
1 Miller et al describe the role of regulation and regulatory bodies in the innovation of flight simulators, these regulations do 
stimulate and steer innovation, but they are mostly described as obligatory points of passage to the market, rather than 
prospective selection criteria. 
2 In the case of gas turbines, market entry is not a sharply defined moment in time, the diffusion process is slow and development 
and adjustment of designs continues. In such a case pre-market selection of viable designs coincides with market selection and 
the selection of dominant designs is difficult to ascribe to either a pre-market or a market phase.  
3 In that sense, most literature deals with winners and overlooks the losers and as a consequence it misses the opportunity to 
study the competition between the winner and its less visible former competitors. 
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2.1  Selection in the R&D phase 
To come to a framework of selection criteria and mechanisms in the R&D phase we turn to 
Garud and Rappa who have shown, in a case study on cochlear implants how different 
measures of performance play a role in the selection process and how these might differ 
among stakeholders and selectors. And, furthermore they show how superior performance on 
one measure can be overruled by performance on other measures or even due to superior 
marketing. In their words:  
“Once evaluation routines become the basis for constructing individual reality, technological 
claims are perceived as relevant only to those who employ the same routines while appearing 
as noise to those who employ different routines.” (Garud and Rappa 1994p. 344). 
 
For the issue of ‘performing better than predecessors’, it implies that historically measures 
might have changed also for a number of designs. Factors that have induced radical 
innovation have probably also induced different measures; some dominant design studies do 
not recognize this option. Das and van de Ven (2000) proposed that firms might use an 
institutional strategy in order to construct new selection criteria for new technologies that do 
not fit the existing performance evaluation criteria. The likes of Utterback (1994) and Bijker 
(1995) have also come to the conclusion that the dominant design is not necessarily the best 
performing option on one measure of performance, but rather a semi-optimization of a 
multitude of performance criteria and cultural connotations. 
Since it is neither fair nor feasible to compare emerging technologies with current designs in 
terms of regular performance characteristics, we propose a twofold set of criteria that might 
explain a) the search for alternative technologies that are promising but do not represent the 
breakthrough as conceptualized in traditional dominant design literature and b) the 
competition and selection within the proposed new regime of hydrogen technologies. 
To define these criteria we turn to the sociology of technological expectations (Van Lente 
1993; Borup et al. 2006; Terlaak and Gong 2008) as this body of literature takes into account 
the importance of expectations of technological and market progress in technological 
development. Without positive expectations of a technology’s potential, no technology 
selector would be tempted to place his bets on that option. In that sense, the competition 
between the different technologies, designs and sociotechnical systems is not a competition 
on future, and thus not existing, markets, but rather a competition on current expectations of 
technology, performance criteria and future market potential. 
According to the sociology of expectations, expectations are thought to be most valuable and 
directive when they are collective; when expectations are shared by many actors and 
organizations and can easily be referred to (Konrad 2006). The emphasis is therefore not on 
the individual psychology of expectations, but moreover on the collective spreading and use 
of expectations and promises in the variation and selection of technological options. 
Expectations are generated and communicated in many ways and by many different actors. In 
the case of hydrogen, and emerging technological systems in general, expectations on 
different levels, from grand visions to expected improvements of enabling technologies, play 
a role (Bakker and van Lente 2008). Expectations are put forward by a community of 
stakeholders and assessed by a number of selectors that have some interest in selecting one or 
more of the options for their own use. Expectations that play a key role in the search for 
promising hydrogen technologies will be discussed in section 4 in which we elaborate on the 
case specific issues. Here we limit ourselves to a twofold set of the most important types of 
expectations in relation to the selection criteria mentioned earlier. First of all there are 
expectations on the need for a new design; these are mainly expectations of future decline of 
the current design, in terms of expected economic and regulatory changes. Second, there are 
expectations on the technological progress of the proposed alternatives themselves and the 
  4market criteria of the future, making them more fit for market competition in the future. 
Especially in the car industry, the process of variation and selection takes places by means of 
prototyping the promising technologies. Expectations about the performance potential of 
components, technological superiority on some measure as most powerful promise, and 
configurations will become means to select the wheat from the shaft. It is in this specific 
constellation that prototypes can do their work. In the next section we discuss the role of 
prototypes in more detail. 
 
3  Prototypes as embodied expectations 
In R&D management literature, prototypes are viewed upon as steps in problem solving 
cycles in research and development of firms (Clark et al. 1987; Thomke et al. 1998; Thomke 
1998). Prototypes are then used for an iterative, trial and error, learning process. Outcomes of 
research or engineering activities are applied in a prototype and used to test or prove a 
scientific or engineering concept; does it work? Or, as may be the case on a somewhat higher 
level of aggregation, a number of technological novelties are fitted together in a prototype in 
order to test or prove their compatibility: does this configuration work? Also, a prototype can 
be used to test the functionality of one or more technologies in a real life-like situation. The 
technologies that were proven to work under laboratory conditions are then tried and tested in 
practice. 
The definition of prototyping as tool in learning processes takes into account only the in-firm 
use of the prototype. Many prototypes do however leave the laboratory gates and serve a 
purpose beyond the firm or research department (Rip and Schot 2002; Suarez 2004). They 
give a high cost signal about the promising technologies a firm considers valuable for its 
strategy. Even though promising technologies are not the same as superior performing 
technologies and the prototype might not show superior performance to the existing dominant 
design, it can still demonstrate the high potential of the technology. It can display a proof of 
principle of the promising technology and serve as platform for wider expectations of the 
technologies used; the prototype embodies a set of expectations. Prototypes can thus be used 
to convince other actors within the firm or outside the firm of the useful properties of 
innovative technology
4. In science and technology studies (STS) literature prototypes are in 
that respect said to configure future alignments between the materiality of the technology and 
its users, the non-material. They are in other words considered to be working artefacts that 
help to shape future worlds (Suchman et al. 2002; Danholt 2005; Wilkie 2008) by engaging 
new technologies with its future context of use. Prototypes can even be means to influence 
policy making when it comes to, as in our case, convincing regulating bodies that the firm 
works on zero-emission vehicles (ZEV’s) and that stringent market policies such as the well 
known Californian ZEV regulation (CARB 2008; Collantes and Sperling 2008) are not 
necessary. 
We hypothesize two dimensions of prototyping efforts: a) prototypes are a reflection of actual 
R&D activities and b) prototypes are used to communicate expectations. There is no such 
thing as a fully naïve, non-strategic, prototype that only serves the company’s internal 
research trajectory. Also there will be no solely strategic prototype that has no relation 
whatsoever with the actual future vision and research trajectories of the company. Stated in 
other words, prototypes are too expensive to function only as a marketing tool and presented 
with too much enthusiasm to be mere R&D tools
5.  
 
                                                      
4 This typically applies in the case of hydrogen passenger cars, because these are taken to the large fairs and exhibited as a 
serious bet on the hydrogen future race. 
5 From personal communication with a leading researcher in the industry we take the notion that there is some sort of hierarchy 
in the dimensions of the prototype. First it is a tool to test the workings of all the components, integrated and in real use. Second 
it is a means to communicate to the firm’s management what the research department has achieved. And, third it is a means for 
the firm to demonstrate its activities and achievements towards the outside world and to some extend also to sponsors of the 
actual research project. 
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positive expectations of that design. This does not necessarily mean that the company 
believes that the specific design will be successful in the market, but rather that it believes 
that it should at least be prepared in terms of knowledge and capabilities of the technology 
that is involved. In innovation processes, companies tend to explore more than one option at a 
time and will not allocate all of their resources on one option, during the exploration phase 
(Stirling 1998), and one can expect firms to explore multiple designs at the same time
6. 
Exploration can be either close to existing markets and products incremental, or rather radical. 
For hydrogen vehicles one can safely state that this is a form of radical innovation and 
therefore radical exploration. Radical exploration has a high degree of uncertainty. Reducing 
uncertainty, on the firm level in terms of not missing out on future markets, can be achieved 
through the exploration of multiple alternative futures. In that sense, the fact that a 
manufacturer develops one or more hydrogen prototypes only indicates that it is exploring 
this option. Not that it is fixed, or locked-in, on this one specific path. However, in the 
process of prototypes development one can expect a narrowing of the paths followed, possible 
leading to the dominant design of the future. 
In the process of exploration, manufacturers develop their own prototypes based on their 
current capabilities and expectations, but they will also keep an open eye towards 
developments and achievements in other firms and research organizations and learn from 
their competitors by copying or imitation (Denrell 2003). In other words, manufacturers do 
learn from others and they might even jump from one research trajectory to another. In our 
analysis we will demonstrate this behaviour of learning from and following other, apparently, 
leading firms. In this process expectations are highly important and a convergence of 
prototyping trajectories will lead to more robust, less contested expectations of hydrogen as 
fuel of the future. This helps to shape path dependency and will strengthen self-fulfilling 
prophecy effect of technological expectations (Van Merkerk and Van Lente 2005), and 
ultimately to the new dominant design in the industry. 
 
In relation to the two pre-market selection criteria of technological options, we formulate two 
hypotheses on the search for the most promising designs: 
 
-  New designs are developed as means to deal with expected changes in markets and 
regulations 
-  Firms have three basic criteria to take into account to select promising designs: current 
and expected performance vs expected future market criteria, specific expected regulatory 
schemes, designs developed by competing firms 
 
In our case study on hydrogen prototypes we test these hypotheses. We will do so by 
analyzing the technological trajectories that were explored and the criteria that were used by 
the industry. 
4  Competing Hydrogen Technologies  
A first glance at the emergence of hydrogen technologies in the car industry reveals two 
opposing forces that do not fit the market dynamics explaining design races. First, hydrogen 
has emerged as a potential technological discontinuity that challenges the old dominant 
design but it is at least an order of magnitude underperforming the current design in terms of 
price vs performance (Romm 2004), so in that sense it has very low competition potential. 
Second, there is no market for hydrogen passenger cars yet, in fact hydrogen cars are not yet 
challenging the old gasoline powered car, and fossil fuel regime. One could be tempted to say 
that hydrogen is thus not a technological discontinuity as yet, and that the era of ferment for 
the creative destruction of the existing dominant design has not started yet. We propose 
however that hydrogen could very well be a technological discontinuity and that it is 
                                                      
6 BMW claims that it is only exploring the hydrogen option, and it does so for the BMW brand, but in the context of the Mini 
brand the company does explore the battery option as well. 
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enters the market, especially because there is and has been strong competition within the new 
regime-in-development. It is this pre-market competition that is understudied so-far in the 
dominant designs literature and hydrogen technologies provide an opportunity do so. 
The hydrogen car is a radical move away from the gasoline powered internal combustion 
engine paradigm and hydrogen prototypes add a set of exemplars of a radically different 
concept. The prototypes thereby make visible a set of new opportunities and heuristics, but 
also challenges. In this sense prototype vehicles are technological platforms that define 
technological opportunities and barriers for further technological and market trials (Dosi 
1988). Here we are primarily interested in the roles of prototypes in this process of design 
switches. Since the first hydrogen vehicle was constructed in 1807, inventors and car makers 
have experimented with this technology. Still, no commercial hydrogen vehicle is available 
today and no one can tell for sure whether there will ever be one. However, car manufacturers 
make us believe that they are serious about it and that they consider hydrogen to be a very 
serious contender in the race for the fuel of the future (Van den Hoed 2005). But, hydrogen is 
a concept rather than a technological option in itself and it comes in many different 
configurations. This goes for the production of hydrogen (natural gas, coal, electrolysis, etc) 
as well as its use in hydrogen cars. These can have varying compositions of storage methods 
and conversion technologies, and even beyond the car, hydrogen energy systems as a whole 
can differ to an even larger extent (McDowall and Eames 2006). So, while hydrogen is 
promoted as the fuel of the future, a competition is going on between the different 
technological options that can constitute the hydrogen car of the future. To establish our unit 
of analysis, we follow Murmann and Frenken (2006) and distinguish different levels on which 
the dominant design can be defined. At the system level, hydrogen challenges the gasoline 
powered car and all its surrounding elements such as fuel infrastructures, maintenance 
stations, etcetera. However, at this point there is no competition as defined by Anderson and 
Tushman (1990) on this level. At the subsystem level, shaped by the components that make 
up the hydrogen car, we do see competition even while there is no product on the market. It is 
this level of aggregation, effectively the core components of the challenging technological 
system, that our study focuses on. 
4.1  Drivetrain and hydrogen storage as critical components 
Manufacturers of hydrogen vehicles have a number of enabling technologies to choose from. 
Most obvious in this respect are the vehicle’s drivetrain and the means of storing the 
hydrogen in the vehicle. The drivetrain is the set of technologies used to transfer the energy 
from the hydrogen to the wheels. In a normal gasoline powered car the drivetrain consists 
basically of the combustion engine and the gearbox. In hydrogen vehicles one can use a 
combustion engine or a fuel cell to convert hydrogen into energy. The energy is then available 
in respectively mechanical or electrical power. In the case of a fuel cell vehicle the electrical 
power is then fed to one or more electric engines to drive the wheels. For hydrogen storage 
there are also a number of options roughly divided in gaseous, liquid and solid storage. 
The technological varieties are used by different manufacturers and in different prototypes. 
Manufacturers explore enabling technologies on the basis of both their technological 
capacities as well as the vision of the manufacturer and selection criteria derived from that 
vision. An interesting example of a manufacturer’s technological choices can be found in an 
article from GM (von Helmolt and Eberle 2007). The most prominent example of this last 
issue is the, rather diverging, preference of BMW to use a combination of liquid hydrogen 
storage and an internal combustion engine. One could expect the technological varieties to 
converge towards a unified and, in the future, dominant design of the hydrogen vehicle. This 
convergence-divergence dimension of expectations can be measured in a static and a dynamic 
fashion. The static measurement only indicates whether car manufacturers at a certain 
moment in time share a number of expectations indicated by their usage of specific enabling 
technologies and their accompanying statements. However, we choose to perform a dynamic 
measurement in which we include the temporal dimension. First, we try to show to what 
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explore and whether or not a dominant design arises. And second, we study the selection 
criteria that apply; technological performance, follow-the-leader strategies and expected 
regulations. 
4.2  Methodology 
The diversity in proposed hydrogen technologies is reflected by the range of hydrogen 
prototypes that have appeared over the last forty years. In the prototypes, different 
technologies have been used in different configurations and designs. The analysis presented in 
this paper focuses on the competition between different hydrogen technologies, and the 
resulting configurations, and we use prototype vehicles as measure for the relative success of 
the competing components. 
For the first part of the analysis we compiled a database of 224 prototypes of hydrogen cars. 
This data was gathered through an online search, using mainly websites dedicated to 
hydrogen vehicles
7, car manufacturers' websites and general car news sites. This search was 
supported by already existing overviews
8 of hydrogen models. Buses, trucks, and utility 
vehicles were excluded from the database. Several technological specifications were included 
in the database; brand, year, storage method, amount of hydrogen stored, conversion 
technology used, manufacturer of the fuel cell or engine, range, maximum speed. 
For the purpose of this analysis we included the hydrogen storage method, the energy 
conversion technology
9, see table 3. These specifications were then plotted on a time line, 
showing either convergence (towards a dominant design) or divergence over time. 
 
Table 2: Storage and energy conversion technologies 
Storage method 
Gaseous Hydrogen (GH)  Liquid Hydrogen (LH)  Metal Hydrides (MH)  Methanol (Meth) 
Energy conversion technology 
Fuel Cell (FC)  Internal Combustion Engine (ICE)  Bivalent ICE (Biv ICE) 
 
Limitations of our data are the following. Our search method does not necessarily generate all 
prototypes ever built, and for some prototypes not all data is available. This could be the 
result of secretiveness on the side of manufacturers. But since most manufacturers use their 
prototypes as communication tools as well, they share most of the information and certainly 
for the more recent models this data is freely available. For the more historic prototypes some 
data is probably missing because information in general was not as available as it is today. 
Still, we hold that the database is adequate for our purposes and is certainly accurate for the 
last ten years in which the majority of models were produced. In the analysis of the selection 
of individual technological options, we used all prototypes in the database. For the analysis of 
configurations we used only those prototypes of which both the storage and conversion 
technology are known and we took only the prototypes from incumbent car manufacturers. 
The prototypes from mother firms are taken together under the header of the mother firm 
instead of the separate brands (e.g. BMW/mini, GM/Chevrolet). 
Some of the prototypes were produced in small series, most were produced individually. In 
our analysis we do not take into account this variable, each prototype model counts as one 
data point. 
 
5  Results: components and configurations 
While the first hydrogen car was developed in 1807, equipped with a single piston 
combustion engine, serious development of hydrogen vehicles started only in the mid 1970’s. 
                                                      
7 www.netinform.net/h2/,  www.hydrogencarsnow.com, consulted from May 2008-March 2009 
8  Walter, Thomas (2007). Database: 04-20-2007, pp. 1 – 37 
9  We consider the words drivetrain and powertrain as synonyms, both referring to the configuration of technologies 
used to power the vehicle. 
  8In those days most hydrogen vehicles were existing models, adapted or retrofitted to run on 
hydrogen. Only recently have manufacturers begun to develop dedicated hydrogen vehicles of 
which the whole design is based on its hydrogen drivetrain. The number of prototypes 
developed shows a steady growth up to the mid 1990’s. From the end of the 1990’s however, 
the number of prototypes developed each years increases sharply. All major car companies 
are involved from there onwards. The cumulative prototype production increases from 32 in 













































Figure 1: Cumulative number of hydrogen prototypes 
 
The bulk of prototypes are developed by the incumbent firms in the automotive industry. 18% 
of the prototypes were built by universities or as part of research networks. This suggests at 
least that the automotive industry responds to questions about future mobility concepts. 
Apparently car manufacturers share a sense of urgency to develop an alternative paradigm for 
personal mobility and that hydrogen is one of the options. The strongest incentives for this 
seem to have been worries over the availability of gasoline, especially in the era of the oil 
crisis, and the threat of stringent emission regulations. In that respect the Californian 
emissions directive in the 90s
10 and the recent CO2 targets in the European Union have had 
most impact (Valentine-Urbschat and Bernhart 2008). 
5.1  Energy conversion technology 
From our database we take that there are three main variations for the drivetrain. These are: 1) 
the hydrogen fuel cell (FC) as main energy convertor, 2) the internal combustion engine (ICE) 
and 3) a bivalent internal combustion engine that can burn hydrogen as well as gasoline; a 
transitional solution. While the fuel cell is often seen as one of the main drivers for hydrogen 
as fuel of the future (because of its high efficiency), the ICE is still considered by a number of 
firms. In the second half of the 1990s a sharp increase in the number of FC prototypes sets in. 
And in 1998 the cumulative number of FC designs overtakes the ICE’s.  
                                                      


























































Figure 2: Cumulative numbers of different types of conversion technology used 
 
From then on, the fuel cell appears to be dominant in the database (figure 2), but we must 
note here that a distinction should be made between vehicles that run primarily on their fuel 
cell and vehicles that run primarily on a plug-in battery but are supported by a (smaller) 
hydrogen fuel cell system. A prototype that primarily runs on its FC will always be equipped 
with a battery or capacitor as buffer for the electricity generated by the FC. The battery is then 
used during acceleration for instance. Also, it can be used as a storage medium for energy 
restored by a regenerative braking system. 
5.2  Fuel Cells 
While a number of fuel cell types are available, the automotive industry chooses the proton 
exchange membrane (PEM) FC. The reason for this is its low temperature of operation 
(<100°C), whereas other types operate only at temperatures of 400 degrees and higher. This is 
thus a clear example of a dominant design, without competition. Although not at the core of 
this study, it is worthwhile to take a look at who is actually manufacturing the FC's. Dedicated 
FC producers like Ballard and UTC Power together provide 38% of the FC's used. Car 
manufacturers themselves have also developed and produced FC's. Most notable here is GM, 
12% of all prototypes uses a GM FC. Other FC producing car companies include Honda and 
Toyota. Both develop FC’s that are used in various other car brands' prototypes. 
5.3  On-board storage 
A particularly intriguing matter is the storage of hydrogen on board the vehicles. While the 
fuel cell is often seen as a true enabler (creating an opportunity) of the hydrogen vision, 
storage is seen as a problematic issue. Because of the low energy density (per volume) of 
hydrogen as a gas under ambient conditions, it is a challenge to take enough hydrogen on 
board to allow for an acceptable range without refuelling. The two obvious ways of doing so 
are pressurising or liquefying the gas. Both require enormous amounts of energy, giving 
energy losses up to 20% for compression and about 30% for liquefying (Department of 
Energy 2002). On top of that, gaseous hydrogen under high pressure is considered as a safety 
hazard. Liquefied hydrogen suffers losses due to so-called boil-off: it is impossible to prevent 
any hydrogen to evaporate and the resulting gas has to be released. As alternatives to these 
relatively simple solutions, a number of more innovative and complex solutions have been 
proposed. Most attention is given to storage in metal hydrides. Here, hydrogen gas is fed to a 
  10tank containing a metal powder and is absorbed as hydrogen atoms in the metal’s atomic 
lattice to form a metal hydride. Using metal hydrides, the hydrogen can be stored with a 
higher volumetric density than that of liquid hydrogen. The main backdrop however is in the 
weight of the total storage system, due to the weight of the metal used. Also the rate of the ab- 
and desorption (increasing refuelling time), and operating temperatures are still problematic. 
Other competition for gaseous and liquid storage comes from storage in chemical hydrides 
(bonding the hydrogen to a liquid chemical substance such as ammonia or hydrazine), solid 
storage in nanomaterials or rather exotic methods such as clathrates (ice-like structures 
capturing the hydrogen). These solutions however are far from practically usable and seldom 
used in prototypes. 
In the meantime, while research is conducted on the alternatives, the automotive industry uses 
liquid and gaseous storage systems in their prototypes. Metal hydrides have been used, but it 
seems that the industry has abandoned them for now. Nonetheless, as can be seen from the 
research activities in the US and the EU, expectations of metal hydrides are still very much 
alive (Bakker and van Lente 2008). 
When looking at the storage methods more closely, figure 3, there was an initial dominance of 
liquid hydrogen storage. Since the late 1990's this dominance was taken over by compressed 
gas. Between 1999 and 2008, 69% of all prototypes produced hold a high-pressure tank. This 
coincides with the increase in the use of fuel cells, both in pure FC's and the BEV/FC hybrids, 
in that period. Some companies have experimented with on-board reformers that produce 
hydrogen from methanol at the turn of the millennium; even though long ranges could be 






















































Figure 3: Cumulative numbers of storage methods used 
 
The dominance of gaseous storage does not necessarily imply that a dominant technology has 
emerged. On the one hand, some companies, again most notably BMW, hold on to liquid 
storage because it enables them to store more hydrogen. On the other hand, gaseous storage is 
done at varying pressures. As can be seen in figure 4, the pressures gradually rise, with 350 
and 700 bar as competing standards
11. Although the 700 bar tanks hold more gas, allowing for 
an increase in the vehicles range, they are less energy efficient, more expensive and pose 
                                                      
11  Some hydrogen filling stations can refuel vehicles at both 350 an 700 bar. 
  11greater safety risks. That is for many manufacturers the reason to stay with the 350 bar tanks, 
























































Figure 4: Cumulative numbers of storage pressures used 
5.4  Configurations 
When the components are taken together in the analysis, we can draw insights on the 
drivetrain / hydrogen storage configurations that are used in the prototypes. From the 
multitude of designs, at a peak in the late 1990s, one designs stands out as the dominant 
design for the hydrogen car, figure 5. This is the fuel cell vehicle with gaseous hydrogen 
storage. This configuration makes use of the PEM FC in combination with gaseous storage at 
either 350 or 700 bar. What the exact selection criteria for the convergence towards the 
FC/GH configuration exactly are does not show from the analysis so far. In the following 












































Figure 5: configurations used in the prototypes 
6  Selection criteria 
In this section we analyze the criteria and mechanisms for the selection of designs. Together 
they have shaped the preliminary dominant design of the hydrogen vehicle of the future. The 
first criterion that we investigate is technological performance. The second is the firms’ 
tendency to follow their industry’s leaders as guidance for technology selection. The third 
relates to expected regulation and firms ideas of the future market. 
6.1  Technological performance as selection criterion 
In the case of hydrogen vehicles one performance measure stands out; the maximum range of 
the vehicle. The challenge therefore, is storing enough hydrogen on-board the vehicle to give 
it as much range as possible. Automakers shared the notion in the 1990s that a car should be 
able to go at least 480 kilometers without refueling (Eisler 2009). Success on this measure 
may not be critical for all purposes (a test of the prototype as ‘configuration that works’ does 
not rely on the range necessarily) of the prototype, but it is both a success in terms of 
engineering and communication. 
Figure 6 shows the performance (range in km) for combustion engine and fuel cell prototypes. 
Data on storage options was not sufficient to study the range performance of these 
specifically; a comparison between ICE’s and fuel cells is thus mainly a comparison in terms 
of energy efficiency
12. The performance improvement curve for the fuel cell vehicles is 
somewhat steeper, even though the performance of both designs is rather fluctuating. 
Interesting here is that firms start working on fuel cell vehicles, even though their range is far 
behind the ICE-vehicles’ range in the early days. This can interpreted in two ways, either the 
fuel cell’s performance was lacking in those days, it was not as efficient in these days 
compared to more recent FC’s. Or the firms chose to build prototypes with limited hydrogen 
supply, just so they could test the performance of the fuel cell without caring about the range 
performance of the full configuration. 
By 1999 the performance of FCs overtakes the ICEs’ and many firms then decide to jump on 
to that trajectory. This indicates that other firms are attracted by the success of the design, 
while only a limited number of firms worked pioneered the fuel cell design when it was 
                                                      
12 Performance vs cost should be assessed as well, but data on this was not available. One should note however that a fuel cell is 
more expensive than an ICE, mainly due to the use of platinum as catalyst. 
  13underperforming. However, BMW, Ford and Daimler (the latter two partially) continue on the 
ICE trajectory, even though this design’s performance lacks behind. BMW claims to be 
convinced of hydrogen as the future fuel, as opposed to battery electric vehicles, since 
hydrogen allows the firm to continue to produce large, powerful and luxurious cars. To 




15, the use of ICE’s in some of their hydrogen prototypes was 
mainly aimed at creating a transitional solution, ICE’s are less costly then FC’s and 































Figure 6: Maximum range as performance measure for ICE and FC vehicles 1990-2008 
 
Fuel cell vehicles have seen progress in terms of range, while the prototypes with a 
combustion engine have made only minor improvements. In relation to selection criteria we 
conclude the following: 
•  Expectations of possible improvements of the technology must have played a key role in 
the selection of fuel cells for further development efforts, but only in a limited number of 
firms. They were applied in prototypes, with very limited performance, long before they 
were outperforming the internal combustion engine. Only after the prototypes proved the 
superior performance of the fuel cell configuration other firms jumped on that trajectory. 
•  Range is however not the only measure relevant to the manufacturers; the ICE design 
does not perform on range as the fuel cell variants, but is still being used by a number of 
manufacturers as either a design that appeals to their customer base specifically or as 
transitional design. 
6.2  Strategic behaviour of firms 
Different firms have taken different routes and applied different strategies. Some have been 
leaders, others have merely followed. In the following we combine both a historic analysis of 
the firms’ search routes and a qualitative analysis of their statements regarding their search 
and their future beliefs to reconstruct what criteria they have applied to the different designs.  
 
                                                      
13www.bmw.com 
14 Another take on hydrogen, 6-11-2002, www.just-auto.com  
15 Personal communication with a former Daimler hydrogen researcher. 
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Figure 7: technological trajectories of individual firms 
  15In figure 7 we show the routes chosen by fourteen manufacturers in their search for the 
hydrogen car of the future
16. The eight configurations are represented in the columns; the 
manufacturer’s name represents a prototype unveiled in the corresponding year. 
 
From this overview, supported by additional qualitative insights, we draw a number of 
preliminary conclusions on the technological trajectories of different designs of the firms and 
the basic strategies they have followed. 
Daimler, BMW, and GM have been hydrogen pioneers from the start. They have, in their role 
pioneers started a number of trajectories. Daimler is the most prominent firm in that sense as 
it was the first firm to develop ICE vehicles and fuel cell vehicles with gaseous and liquid 
storage and it was the first to develop a hydrogen vehicle with an on-board methanol 
reformer. Since then Daimler’s focus has been on the FC/GH configuration and this is 
highlighted by its 100-cars fleet
17 of test vehicles that are operated in practice currently. The 
combustion engine vehicle it has constructed in 2000, 2002, and 2006 were larger transport 
vans. Daimler has stressed more than once that hydrogen will be the fuel of the future
18, 
considering its advantage over the alternatives, mainly the battery electric vehicle, in terms of 
range and re-fuelling ability.  
BMW has been one of the pioneers but it has stuck to its ICE trajectory throughout the years. 
The only variation in designs has been the use of both exclusively hydrogen vehicles and so-
called bivalent vehicles that can run on hydrogen and hydrocarbon fuels. The bivalent design 
has the advantage that is does not rely on a widespread hydrogen infrastructure. Since 2004 
BMW has partly switched to the pure hydrogen configuration in order to stress its good faith 
in the future of hydrogen: “It demonstrates BMW’s support for a hydrogen infrastructure by 
producing an ICE that produces truly near-zero emissions
19”. While BMW does use fuel 
cells in the drivetrain, it has experimented with hydrogen fuel cells for auxiliary power to be 
used by electric systems in the car. 
Toyota was the second firm to adopt fuel cells, apart from GM in the late 1960s that is, and it 
has done so with an in-house developed FC. Most other firms have used fuel cells that were 
developed by specialized firms such as Ballard. In terms of variation, Toyota has not diverted 
from the fuel cell configuration. This goes for all Japanese manufacturers, except Mazda that 
has developed a so-called rotary combustion engine. Even though Toyota is active in the 
market with its hybrid vehicles, it has expressed high expectations of fuel cell technology in 
terms of cost reductions: from $1 million in 2005 to $50k by 2015. 
Honda has not pioneered any configuration from the start, but with its big statements on 
market entry it has certainly played a key-role in the industry. According to Honda its latest 
hydrogen model, the FCX Clarity, is a production-ready vehicle and it was engineered to be 
built on a conventional assembly line. And, in contrast to most other hydrogen prototypes this 
is a “dedicated platform hydrogen FC vehicle
20” instead of a retrofitted conventional model. 
Some 200 vehicles have been built and are leased to selected users. The lease price of $600 
per month is however not a reflection of the actual costs of the vehicle. It is mainly the FC 
that causes the high production costs. Nonetheless, Honda US's CEO Tetsutuo Iwamura states 
that: "The FCX Clarity is a shining symbol of the progress we've made with FC vehicles and 
of our belief in the promise of this technology
21”. 
With four of the industry hydrogen-leaders focussing on the fuel cell / gaseous hydrogen 
design, this has become an attractor for many of the followers in the industry. Since 2002 this 
has really taken off as the emerging dominant design for hydrogen vehicles, as was also 
shown from the data of the individual components and configurations. The dominance of the 
fuel cell / gaseous hydrogen configuration is not an absolute one. BMW and Mazda have not 
conformed and other firms do experiment with different designs. True path dependency or 
                                                      
16 -  Gasoline reformer + FC was left out (GM /Chevrolet 2001, Toyota 2001), like the Ford Trivalent ICE, 
DaimlerChrysler’s latest ICE prototypes (2002, 2006) were notably larger vehicles than the rest of their hydrogen fleet. 
17 http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,3615094,00.html  Deutsche Welle 03.09.2008 
18 Daimler, sustainability report 2008 
19 BMW press release 04/14/2008 
20 Honda press release 05/20/2008 
21 Honda press release: ‘Honda Debuts All-New FCX Clarity Advanced Fuel Cell Vehicle’, 11/14/2008 
  16lock-in is thus not at play here. But, right up to the point that this design became dominant, 
variation was at its maximum during a relatively short period from 1999 untill 2001. Metal 
hydrides were used in the first phase (1975-1993) in combination with an ICE, then for a 
short period in combination an FC (1996-2001). And the methanol-reformer route, to avoid 
dependency of hydrogen infrastructure, was used for five years and was used last in 2001. 
The industry leaders have experimented with multiple designs, whereas the followers have 
often only experimented with two designs that were previously developed by others. Peugeot 
and Suzuki are true followers, in the sense that they have entered at a late stage and only tried 
on configuration since it become dominant. 
 
7  Conclusions 
Considering that one of the major rationales for the industry to work on hydrogen vehicles has 
been
22 regulatory pressure from governments (Californian standards for zero-emission 
vehicles and announced EU regulations on CO2 for 2012), performance per se cannot be the 
only criterion. Hydrogen vehicles would most probably never been considered by most of the 
manufacturers. And furthermore, even within the upcoming regime of hydrogen designs, 
regulation provides an anticipated selection criterion. The California regulation demanded 
zero-emission vehicles, thus ruling out the methanol route. And, to some extend it ruled out 
the ICE configurations due to NOx emissions from burning the hydrogen in the presence of 
air. EU regulation on a firm’s fleet average CO2 emissions also makes that emissions are at 
least as important as performance in the future. As a result the industry has not just gone with 
the best performing options (from a user’s perspective), but has also taken into account the 
criteria set by regulation.  
Performance, and certainly expected performance enhancements, has played a role in the 
choice for the fuel cell over the combustion engine. It simply provides superior energy 
efficiency. But it does so at much higher cost and this hints at the fact that many firms 
anticipate a market in which fuel prices will rise to the extent that superior efficiency can 
make up for high cost of purchase. Cost of ownership and especially of use will become much 
more important in the future than it is today, so believe the manufacturers. Hence, they expect 
a shift in selection criteria. BMW has kept to its own track by focusing on what they expected 
to be their selection environment in the future. Be it that they anticipate no radical changes in 
the future and that their customers will apply the same criteria as they use now. 
As for the strategies taken by the firms, a true industry leader such as Daimler has been 
involved in extensive exploration of different trajectories and opportunities
23. Many, smaller, 
manufacturers have followed Daimler’s lead and for those we claim that their main selection 
criterion was exactly to follow the leader. GM and Toyota have not done so initially but have 
joined the rest of the industry later on. 
Path-dependency is only limited for individual firms. Most stick to the FC/GH trajectory, but 
some do leave this trajectory occasionally. A firm can switch trajectories easily as is not 
locked-in due to huge investments in production capacity for one design. However, the 
industry as a whole does seem locked-in in the trajectory that has become dominant. 
Following the sociology of expectations, this can be explained by the fact that expectations of 
fuel cells and gaseous storage have become most robust and widely accepted because the 
majority of prototypes is fitted with these technologies. The expectations of these have 
become rather uncontested in the hydrogen community and make that the industry has created 
its own lock-in in the direction of the dominant design of the future, especially because they 
tend to follow their leaders. 
 
                                                      
22 Before the 1990s the oil crises and general notions of depletion oil reserves were most probably also a strong incentive to look 
beyond gasoline and diesel. 
23 It was certainly at the end of the 90s when its research funds were sheer endless, according to personal communication with a 
former engineer. 
  17Even though firms have taken different routes in their prototyping activities, one truly 
dominant configuration has come out of forty years of development; the fuel cell in 
combination with gaseous hydrogen storage. From our analysis of the firms’ search 
trajectories and their accompanying statements we have learnt about their strategies and of 
leaders and followers. The divergent option with a combustions engine that relies on liquid 
hydrogen storage is only kept in the portfolio by a few. BMW is the only manufacturer that 
truly endorses this design and it does so mainly because of its ideas on future markets. 
Divergent drivetrain options such as on-board reforming of methanol have disappeared from 
the prototypes completely. Our qualitative analysis shows that the five most active 
manufacturers diverge in their hydrogen statements. While BMW, Daimler and Honda have 
set their own courses, Ford has no clear singular trajectory towards a hydrogen future and 
Toyota openly shares its hydrogen-pessimism with the public. In terms of expectations of 
hydrogen as such, the divergence of statements from the manufacturers is testament to the fact 
that hydrogen expectations are not held collectively in the industry and that hybrid and 
electric technology are also strongly considered. Nonetheless, the signs given by BMW and 
Honda can be interpreted in a positive manner. This goes for BMW in the sense that it states it 
does not believe in a pure electric future. And Hondas activities are promising even though it 
endorses a hybrid and battery-electric transition phase. 
On the criteria that we have studied we conclude that all three criteria, performance, 
assessments of other firms’ activities and regulatory anticipation together make for the 
selection of technological trajectories. The fuel cell outperforms the ICE, however not 
necessarily in production costs yet, but is still used by some firms. We have witnessed firms 
following ‘popular’ trajectories, such as the methanol route, metal hydrides use and ultimately 
following the emerging dominant configuration. Anticipation on regulation has certainly 
pushed the industry to engage the search for new technologies and has, for instance, ruled out 
the methanol route. 
Striking however is the fact that most manufacturers jump trajectories as they please and do 
not seem to suffer from path dependency. This makes that any sort of lock-in would merely 
be one of a relative sort, technologically they can manage to construct any model they want, 
but firms hold expectations of one model and most have chosen to move to, and stay on the 
FC/GH trajectory.  
The results show that hydrogen prototypes are used as exploration and learning platforms 
within the firms, and not just objects to show off their good intentions related to 
environmental issues. This is supported by earlier patent analyses that show a similar pattern 
of rise of attention for hydrogen from the end of the 1990s. In two of the patent studies (Van 
den Hoed 2005; Oltra and Saint Jean 2009). The number of patents on hydrogen technologies 
takes-off in the mid 1990’s, roughly 3-4 years earlier than the prototypes. This can very well 
be the time needed to integrate the newly developed technologies in a prototype vehicle. It 
should be mentioned that in the French study, stagnation is visible in the French national 
database from 2004 on. PSA (Citroën and Peugeot), in contrast with Renault, does however 
continue to apply for hydrogen patents. By contrast, the third patent study shows no such 
take-off at all in the patents studied (Frenken et al. 2004). 
We conclude that the contours of the new dominant design can be made visible through the 
study of prototypes. Prototypes can thereby be used to untangle the dynamics of emerging 
dominant designs before they enter the market. And, it provides an alternative to the ex-post 
conclusions that have been drawn in literature so far. 
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